Assessing the scope of the post-Ipp 'close association' special limitation period for child abuse cases by Mathews, Benjamin
  
 
COVER SHEET 
 
 
 
This is the author-version of article published as: 
 
Mathews, Dr Ben (2004) Assessing the Scope of the Post-Ipp “Close 
Associate” Special Limitation Period for Child Abuse Cases. James Cook 
University Law Review 11:pp. 63-83. 
 
Accessed from   http://eprints.qut.edu.au 
 
 
Copyright 2004 James Cook University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
ASSESSING THE SCOPE OF THE POST-IPP ‘CLOSE ASSOCIATE’ SPECIAL 
LIMITATION PERIOD FOR CHILD ABUSE CASES 
 
DR BEN MATHEWS* 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2002 Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence1 recommended the enactment of a special 
limitation period for the commencement of personal injuries litigation in cases where a child 
is injured by a parent or a person who is in a ‘close relationship’ with the child’s parent. A 
person would be in such a relationship with a child’s parent if he or she had a relationship 
with the child’s parent, such that the child’s parent might be influenced not to bring an action 
on the child’s behalf (the first limb of the definition); or, if the person’s relationship with the 
child’s parent was such that the child might be unwilling to disclose the relevant acts (the 
second limb of the definition).2 In recommending this special limitation period, the Ipp Report 
appeared to acknowledge features of some classes of child abuse cases which make a standard 
personal injuries limitation period unjustifiable. Following this recommendation, New South 
Wales and Victoria enacted legislative changes which aim to give survivors of child abuse 
perpetrated by a parent or a person classed as a ‘close associate’ of a parent a justifiable 
period of time in which to institute personal injuries proceedings.  
 
This article discusses the Ipp Report’s recommendations regarding the special limitation 
period and the reasons given for those recommendations, which are largely motivated by 
psychological evidence concerning the effects of child abuse. It then outlines the legislative 
provisions in New South Wales and Victoria, which embody the essence of the Ipp 
                                                 
* LLB (JCU) BA (Hons) (QUT) PhD (QUT); Lecturer in the School of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
1 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report (2002) Canberra; 
hereafter generally referred to as the Ipp Report. 
2 Hereafter referred to as the second limb. 
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recommendations. The article then consults evidence of the psychological effects of child 
sexual abuse, and studies of non-disclosure and delayed disclosure by survivors of child 
sexual abuse, to inform an assessment of the conceptual basis of the second limb of the close 
associate provision. Using the psychological evidence and empirical evidence of disclosure 
and non-disclosure as analytical tools, this article will argue that the second limb of the close 
associate provision would be better predicated not on the tortfeasor’s perceived relationship 
with the child’s parent, but on the nature of the acts and circumstances of abuse and their 
impact on the child’s willingness to disclose their abuse. The article is of particular relevance 
to New South Wales and Victoria, but, given the desirability and likelihood of other 
Australian jurisdictions enacting a special limitation period for child abuse cases, it is also 
relevant to the rest of Australia. 
 
 
II STANDARD LIMITATION PERIOD FOR PERSONAL INJURY CASES 
 
While enabling individuals to have access to courts to seek civil compensation for personal 
injuries, statutes also impose time limits on when a person can institute such proceedings. 
Motivating these limits are a number of policy concerns which possess theoretical and 
practical force when applied to most types of personal injuries actions. The best of these is 
that a reasonable limitation period is necessary to ensure a fair trial for the defendant by 
ensuring the availability of fresh evidence. Other reasons acknowledged as supporting 
limitation periods are that people need to be able to proceed with their lives unencumbered by 
the threat of an old claim, plaintiffs should not sleep on their rights, and the public has an 
interest in the timely resolution of disputes.3 Accordingly, in New South Wales, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
                                                 
3 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 551 ff. 
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Territory, actions seeking damages for personal injuries must generally be commenced within 
three years from the date on which the cause of action arose.4 
 
A Extensions of time 
In cases where time has expired, most limitation statutes permit plaintiffs to apply to the court 
for an extension of time, based on the claim that the plaintiff has only recently discovered 
material facts decisive to the case, such as the presence and extent of the injury, as well as its 
cause.5 However, in extension applications made by adult survivors of child sexual abuse, 
judicial findings about the knowledge the applicant is perceived to already have possessed, 
and expectations about when it was reasonable for him or her to have taken steps to ascertain 
the decisive facts and hence to have instituted proceedings, can deny the application for an 
extension of time.6 In addition, to grant the extension of time, the court must be satisfied that 
the justice of the case requires the extension. Such satisfaction will only crystallise if, among 
                                                 
4 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 18A(2) and 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11; Limitation 
of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) 
ss 5(1AA) and 27D(1)(a); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 12(1)(b). In 
New South Wales and Victoria, actions brought concerning injury sustained after the amendments in 
those jurisdictions have time running from the date of discoverability rather than from when the cause 
of action accrued: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D. The 
Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 38(1)(b) sets a time limit of four years for actions for trespass to the 
person, assault and battery, and s 38(1)(c)(vi) sets a period of six years for negligence. As Wilson v 
Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363 held that an action exists in both negligence and trespass for the acts 
constituting child sexual abuse, different limitation periods can operate. An application for special 
leave to appeal this decision was refused: Wilson v Horne (1999) 19 Leg Rep SL4a. At the time of 
writing, bills proposing amendments to the legislation in Western Australia (Limitation Bill 2004) and 
Tasmania (Limitation Amendment Bill 2004) were being considered, so references to current 
provisions in those jurisdictions need to be read subject to possible amendment in the near future. 
5 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 58, 60A, 60G, 62A and 62D; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 
31; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(3); Limitation of Actions 
Act 1958 (Vic) ss 23A and 27K; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44. The 
current Limitation Act 1935 (WA) has no general extension provision. 
6 Arguably, on tenuous reasoning: see B Mathews, ‘Judicial consideration of reasonable conduct by 
survivors of child sexual abuse’ (2004) 27(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal (in print); 
and see Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2000] QSC 306 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, White J, 8 September 2000); and on appeal: Carter v 
Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, 
Queensland Court of Appeal, McPherson JA and Muir J; Atkinson J dissenting, 24 August 2001); 
Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ, 21 June 2002); and 
Hopkins v State of Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, McGill 
DCJ, 24 February 2004); contrast Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 
Byrne J, 22 April 1993) and Woodhead v Elbourne [2001] 1 Qd R 220. See also Johnson v Director of 
Community Services (Vic) [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-540; SD v Director-General of Community 
Welfare Services (Vic) (2001) 27 Fam LR 695; and McGuinness v Clark (Unreported, County Court of 
Victoria, Duckett J, 7 May 2003). 
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other things, the court is of the view that the defendant’s right to a fair trial has not been 
prejudiced by the loss of evidence with which he or she could have mounted a defence. Due 
to factors that will be discussed in Part IV of this article, claims for damages arising from 
alleged child sexual abuse will more often be brought after long periods of time than will 
other types of claims, and so applications for extensions of time are more susceptible to 
defeat, whether based solely or partly on this consideration of delay.7 Such applications in the 
context of child abuse cases will be discussed further in Part IV to analyse the second limb of 
the close associate provision. 
 
B Effect of minority 
Most jurisdictions have recognised that an injured child is impeded from bringing an action, 
and of being able to compel an action to be brought on his or her behalf, and so have adapted 
the application of the standard three year limitation period for cases of injury to children. This 
adaptation has worked through the device of classifying minors as being under a legal 
disability, and this status has been given the effect of stopping the limitation period from 
running until the attainment of majority. In most but not all Australian jurisdictions, this 
suspension of time during minority still operates.8 In Queensland, South Australia, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, therefore, a survivor of child sexual 
abuse has three years from turning 18 to institute proceedings, and in Western Australia a 
survivor will have until 22 or 24 depending on the whether the action is brought in trespass or 
negligence. However, as will now be seen, Tasmania has a different approach, and, of 
particular relevance to this article, the position in New South Wales and Victoria has been 
changed in the wake of the Ipp Report. 
 
                                                 
7 In Queensland, Carter and Applications 861 and 864, above n 6, are good examples of this; as well, 
see Calder v Uzelac [2003] VSCA 175 (Unreported, Victoria Court of Appeal, Buchanan and Chernov 
JJA and Ashley AJA, 14 November 2003); but contrast McGuinness v Clark, above n 6. 
8 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 5(2), 11, 29(2)(c); see also Limitation of Actions Act 1936 
(SA) s 45; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(2), 26; Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 40; Limitation Act 1985 
(ACT) ss 8(3), 30; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 4(1), 36. 
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III IPP REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
 
A Recommendation regarding minority and disability 
The terms of reference of the Ipp Review Panel were to examine methods to reform the 
common law to limit liability and quantum of damages in civil proceedings.9 Among these 
terms, the Review Panel was required to develop and evaluate options for a uniform limitation 
period of three years for all persons.10 To this end, one of the significant recommendations of 
the Ipp Report was the negation of the traditional classification of a child as being under a 
legal disability, at least for those children who were in the custody of a parent or guardian 
(and could therefore have their actions brought by the parent within a standard time period). 
Consequently, this would abolish the suspension of time during minority. Effectively, 
discoverability of the child’s cause of action would be sheeted home to the child’s parent or 
guardian, and the parent or guardian would be expected to institute proceedings on the child’s 
behalf, within three years of the cause of action arising – irrespective of whether the child was 
still a child or not.11 
 
1 Adoption of recommendations in New South Wales and Victoria 
New South Wales and Victoria adopted the substance of these recommendations. Legislative 
provisions enacted in 2002 and 2003 respectively abolished the classification of a child as 
being under a legal disability (in Victoria, termed legal incapacity) if he or she was in the 
custody of a capable parent or guardian.12 With this came the abolition of the suspension of 
time during minority,13 and the imposition on the injured child’s parent or guardian of the 
responsibility to bring the action. In New South Wales, the action must be brought within 
                                                 
9 Ipp Report, above n 1, ix. 
10 Ibid x. 
11 Ibid 95-97 [6.46-6.51], Recommendation 25. 
12 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(2)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(1)(a). The 
provisions apply to cases where injury was sustained as a result of acts occurring on or after 6 
December 2002, and 21 May 2003 respectively: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50A(2); Limitation of 
Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27N. 
13 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(2). 
 6
three years from when the action is discoverable, while in Victoria the action must be brought 
within six years from this date.14 Discoverability in these cases is sheeted home to the child’s 
parent or guardian,15 and an action will be discoverable on the first date when the parent knew 
or ought to have known the fact of the injury, the fact that the injury was caused by the fault 
of the defendant, and the fact that the injury was of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing 
an action.16 In both jurisdictions, a longstop of 12 years from the date of the wrongful acts 
applies.17 In New South Wales, but not Victoria, there is a special extension provision for 
cases where an adult plaintiff who was injured as a child can demonstrate that his or her 
parent irrationally failed to bring an action on his or her behalf.18 
 
These changes bring New South Wales and Victoria close to but beyond the position 
operating in Tasmania, which has possessed a unique situation in Australian jurisdictions for 
some time. Since 1974, Tasmania has not suspended time for minors injured while in the 
custody of a parent, in cases of personal injury caused through negligence, nuisance or breach 
of duty.19 As the phrase ‘breach of duty’ has been held by the Victorian Court of Appeal to 
include acts of intentional trespass, this exclusion of the suspension of time operates whether 
the action is brought in trespass or negligence.20 Tasmania, however, lacks the legislative 
detail of the New South Wales and Victorian legislation: its statute does not have definitions 
of discoverability, nor does it have similar extension provisions to those in the majority of the 
mainland jurisdictions. As well, and of even more significance given its exclusion of the 
suspension of time for minors, Tasmania lacks a special limitation period of the type enacted 
in New South Wales and Victoria. 
                                                 
14 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 50C(1) and 50F; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 27J and 27E. 
15 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(3); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(3). 
16 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50D(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27F(1). 
17 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(b). For a 
discussion of how these provisions will operate, see B Mathews, ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods 
for cases of injury to a child by a parent or close associate: new jurisdictional gulfs’ (2004) 12(3) TLJ 
239. 
18 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62D. 
19 Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26(6). 
20 Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325, 330.   
 7
 
B Recommendation regarding special limitation period for injury by a parent or 
someone classed as being in a ‘close relationship’ with the parent 
The Ipp Panel was charged with the contraction of liability and quantum of damages, and the 
Ipp Report’s recommendation of the general abolition of the legal disability of minors, and 
the imposition on children’s parents and guardians of the responsibility to institute 
proceedings on their behalf within a shorter period of time, exemplify the strategic 
approaches used to fulfil the Panel’s policy brief. This makes the recommendations made by 
the Ipp Report about cases of injury to a child inflicted by the child’s parent or by a person 
who was in a ‘close relationship’ with the child’s parent all the more remarkable, constituting 
a particularly forceful endorsement for enacting special limitation provisions for certain 
classes of case. Instead of reverting to the standard position of suspending time during 
minority for cases where a child is injured by a parent or by someone having a close 
relationship with the parent, thus giving the child until 21 to institute proceedings, the Ipp 
Report made a well-informed and significant recommendation. 
 
The Ipp Report recognised that in cases where a child is injured by a parent or a person 
classed as being in a close relationship with a parent, there are unjustifiable difficulties 
presented by a standard limitation period of majority plus three years.21 The Report defined a 
person as being in a ‘close relationship’ with the child’s parent or guardian if the relationship 
was such that:22 
 
(a) the parent or guardian might be influenced by the potential defendant not to 
bring a claim on behalf of the minor against the potential defendant; or 
(b) the minor might be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the nature 
of the actions that allegedly caused the damage. 
                                                 
21 Ipp Report, above n 1, 96-97 [6.52-6.55]. 
22 Ibid 96 [6.52]. 
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The Ipp Report recommended that in these cases, ‘special rules’23 should be enacted to 
provide a justifiable period for plaintiffs to institute legal proceedings. First, the Report 
recommended that the limitation period should only begin to run from when the plaintiff 
turned 25 years old.24 Second, the limitation period should be three years.25 Third, since the 
date of discoverability may not occur until after expiry of this three year period (that is, after 
the plaintiff turns 28), the court should have discretion at any time to extend the limitation 
period to the expiry of a period three years after the date of discoverability.26 
 
1 Reasons underpinning the recommendation 
The reasons for the recommendation that there be special rules for these cases are not 
thoroughly detailed in the Report. However, there is an explicit statement that the 
recommended strategy would ‘give plaintiffs a reasonable time to be free of the influence of 
the parent, guardian or potential defendant (as the case may be) before having to commence 
proceedings.’27 Earlier in the Report, in the context of determining when a limitation period 
should commence, there is also an acknowledgment that sexual and physical abuse often 
produces delayed psychological effects.28 There appears to be, therefore, three notable points 
in the underlying reasoning of the Panel. The first explicit point is that a child who is injured 
by a parent or by a person in a ‘close relationship’ with the parent requires a substantial 
period of time in which to become sufficiently free of the influence of the parent or person in 
a close relationship with the parent to be able to commence legal proceedings against the 
tortfeasor. The second point is that the Panel recognised that delayed psychological effects 
commonly occur in cases of child abuse, both sexual and physical. Third, assuming that the 
Panel’s reasoning about the delayed psychological effect of child sexual and physical abuse 
                                                 
23 Ipp Report, above n 1, 96 [6.53]. 
24 Ibid 96 [6.54]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 97 [6.55]. 
27 Ipp Report, above n 1, 96 [6.54]. 
28 Ibid 88 [6.11]. 
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informed their conclusions about the special limitation period, the recommended special 
limitation period can apply not only to cases of sexual abuse but also to physical abuse of 
children.29 
 
The Ipp Panel did not invent these reasons, but implicitly endorsed a body of judicial and 
academic commentary about the reasons for not having a standard limitation period for cases 
of child abuse.30 This body of commentary is not mere opinion since it is itself driven by 
recognition of psychological evidence about the sequelae of child sexual abuse. This evidence 
will be discussed in Part IV, but it can be briefly noted here that the evidence proves that in 
child abuse cases, particularly when the abuse is sexual, the nature and extent of the 
psychological injury often takes many years to manifest, and the causal connection between 
abuse and injury also typically takes a long time to be realised. Moreover, the tortfeasor’s 
position of superiority often deters survivors from commencing litigation; and in many cases, 
due to feelings of shame, embarrassment, and a misplaced sense of responsibility for the acts, 
the victim will not even disclose the abuse, or disclosure will only occur after many years.  
 
The adoption of a special limitation period by New South Wales and Victoria demonstrates a 
further endorsement of this view, and it is clear from statements in New South Wales 
Parliamentary Debates that the primary or even sole function of the special limitation period 
                                                 
29 This article focuses on the use of the second limb of the close associate provision in cases of child 
sexual abuse, because the evidence referred to in this article is of direct relevance to cases of child 
sexual abuse, and because it is anticipated that more claims will be brought for child sexual abuse than 
for child physical abuse. However, it may be that the special limitation period is also applicable to 
claims for damages brought in cases of child physical abuse. 
30 See for example Thomas J in W v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 709, 729-30; Atkinson J in 
Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335, above n 
6, [98]; see also the Canadian Supreme Court decision in M (K) v M (H) [1992] 3 SCR 6, and obiter 
dicta in the European Court of Human Rights decision in Stubbings v United Kingdom (1996) Eur Ct 
HR Applications 22083/93; 22095/93, [56]; and B Mathews, ‘Limitation periods and child sexual 
abuse cases: Law, psychology, time and justice’ (2003) 11(3) TLJ 218, 230 ff; A Marfording, ‘Access 
to Justice for Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (1997) 5 TLJ 221; and L Bunney, ‘Limitation of 
Actions: Effect on Child Sexual Abuse Survivors in Queensland’ (1998) 18 Queensland Lawyer 128. 
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is to make justifiable provision for the institution of civil proceedings in child abuse cases.31 
The provisions enacted in these two jurisdictions will now be detailed. 
 
2 Adoption of recommendations in New South Wales and Victoria: enactment of 
special limitation period 
New South Wales and Victoria adopted the substance of the Ipp recommendations, although 
the provisions enacted were not identical to those modelled by the Ipp Report. The provisions 
state that when a child is injured by the child’s parent or guardian, or by a person who is a 
‘close associate’ of the child’s parent or guardian (the legislative provisions replace the Ipp 
Report’s use of the ‘close relationship’ descriptor with ‘close associate’), the action is 
discoverable by the victim when he or she turns 25 years of age, or when the cause of action 
is actually discoverable, whichever is later.32 A longstop period of 12 years runs from when 
the victim turns 25,33 therefore ending when the victim turns 37. Before turning to the close 
associate provision, and in particular, the problematic second limb of that provision, it is 
pertinent to comment on the significance of the confinement of discoverability to actual 
discoverability, and to clarify the effect of the new provisions. 
 
The stipulation of actual discoverability is significant because it rules out any possibility of an 
argument by a defendant based on constructive discoverability. A defendant cannot claim that 
a plaintiff’s time period started to run from when it could be argued that the plaintiff ought to 
have known of the three discoverability factors. Such arguments about what a survivor of 
child abuse ought to have known, and when that person ought to have known particular facts 
related to discoverability and hence ought to have instituted proceedings, have been 
                                                 
31 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 November 2002 (Michael Egan, 
Treasurer, Minister of State Development and Vice-President of the Executive Council), at 6896 ff: 
‘There will be very few cases that fall within this important exception. In the main, this exception will 
be used when a child has been the victim of abuse.’  
32 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(a). 
33 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(b). 
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successfully used to defeat applications for extensions of time.34 If the time period here ran 
from discoverability whether actual or constructive, rather than running only from actual 
discoverability, much of the benefit of the special limitation period could have been lost.  
 
The effect of the special limitation period in New South Wales and Victoria is that in this 
class of case, a plaintiff who has turned 25 has three years to institute proceedings once he or 
she has actual knowledge of the facts of the injury, of the defendant causing that injury, and 
of the injury being of sufficient seriousness that it justifies legal action. Effectively then, a 
plaintiff here may in some cases have until turning 37 to institute proceedings. On the basis of 
the passage of time, a plaintiff could only be prevented from bringing an action within this 12 
year period if it can be shown by the defendant that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
three discoverability factors at a date more than three years before the plaintiff actually 
instituted proceedings.  
 
This is a significant widening of time for plaintiffs in this context, effectively expanding the 
limitation period in cases of child abuse inflicted on a child by a parent or close associate of a 
parent from the old limit of 21 to the new limit of 37. It is hoped that other Australian 
jurisdictions will follow the example of these two States, both to enhance access to justice in 
these cases, and to remedy the current situation which gives people in New South Wales and 
Victoria a much longer period of time to institute proceedings than possessed by their 
counterparts elsewhere in Australia.35 While being the first Australian jurisdictions to enact a 
special limitation period for child abuse cases, New South Wales and Victoria are not the first 
to do so in the wider context. In fact, in Canada, the provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Ontario, Saskatchewan and 
the Yukon permit the institution at any time of civil actions based on sexual assault, having 
                                                 
34 See for example Carter and Hopkins, above n 5. 
35 For detailed treatment of this point, see Mathews, ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods’, above n 17, 
256. 
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abolished time limits for this class of case.36 Furthermore, in five Canadian jurisdictions, the 
importance placed on the possible impact on the plaintiff of various relationships of 
dependency on the tortfeasor have motivated the extension of this abolition of time beyond 
sexual assault cases to all types of assault.37 
 
3 The close associate provision 
Apart from cases that will arise from injury caused by a parent or guardian, arguably the 
major proportion of cases covered by the special limitation period will be cases involving a 
close associate of a parent or guardian. A ‘close associate’ of a parent or guardian of the 
victim is defined as:38 
 
a person whose relationship with the parent or guardian is such that:  
(a) the parent or guardian might be influenced by the person not to bring a 
claim on behalf of the victim against the person; or  
(b) the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the 
conduct or events in respect of which the cause of action is founded.  
 
The definition of ‘close associate’ includes two circumstances which justify extending the 
special time period beyond the situation where the parent or guardian is the tortfeasor. The 
                                                 
36 Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s 3(4)(k)(i); Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s 
2.1(2)(a) and (b); Limitations Act, RSNL 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 
1998, c L-8, s 2.1(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5)(a) and (b); Nunavut Act, SC 
1993, c 28, s 29 – which adopts the Northwest Territories provisions; Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, 
s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 
2002, c 139, s 2(3). 
37 In Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, the abolition of time 
limits extends to all actions for trespass to the person, assault or battery where at the time of the injury 
the person was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency with one of the 
parties who caused the injury: Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s 2.1(2)(b)(ii); 
Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(1)-(2) (adopted in Nunavut: Nunavut Act, SC 
1993, c 28, s 29); Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c 
L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(b)(ii). 
38 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(2). The New South 
Wales provision is reproduced here. The Victorian provision is substantially identical but uses some 
different terms, replacing ‘an action’ with ‘a claim’ in (a), and replacing ‘the conduct or events in 
respect of which the cause of action is founded’ with ‘the act or omission alleged to have resulted in the 
death or personal injury’ in (b). 
 13
first limb embodies the possibility that the tortfeasor’s relationship with the injured child’s 
parent might dissuade the child’s parent from bringing an action on behalf of the child against 
the tortfeasor, even if the parent possesses knowledge of the events, the child’s injury, and the 
seriousness of the child’s injuries. Being predicated on the parent’s inability or unwillingness 
to bring legal proceedings despite having sufficient knowledge of the discoverability factors, 
this is conceptually related to the s 62D special extension provision in New South Wales 
allowing an extension of time to an adult who, despite sustaining injury as a child while in the 
custody of a capable parent, did not have an action brought on his or her behalf by that parent. 
This limb of the provision clearly addresses the Ipp Panel’s concerns of ensuring that an 
injured child is enabled to institute proceedings, and that a plaintiff be free of the influence of 
the defendant before having to commence proceedings, in this instance with the defendant’s 
influence being exerted on the child’s parent by the tortfeasor. For the purpose of this article, 
there appears to be no obvious problem with this limb of the provision, and it is unnecessary 
to make any further comment about it. 
 
However, the second limb of the provision presents a problem requiring examination. Unlike 
the first limb, where the parent has knowledge but is unwilling to bring the action because of 
a personal connection with the tortfeasor, the second limb has a different conceptual basis. It 
is concerned with situations where the injured child’s parent never gains knowledge of the 
child’s injury because the child is unwilling to disclose to his or her parent the relevant acts. 
Yet, according to the way the provision is drafted, with a principle clause overarching and 
applying equally to each of the two limbs, the definition’s application is limited to 
circumstances where the child’s unwillingness to disclose is caused by the child’s perception 
of the tortfeasor’s relationship with the parent. 
 
It is the reason for the child’s unwillingness to disclose that appears contentious, and this 
requires analysis because of the highly significant consequence arising from the determination 
of a defendant being classed as a close associate or not. The consequence is that in many 
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cases, a plaintiff who can successfully argue that the defendant falls within the definition of 
‘close associate’ will gain access to the justice system because of the special limitation period, 
whereas if the plaintiff cannot show this, time will have expired. In many cases of child 
abuse, the standard limitation period will have expired by the time the plaintiff can pursue a 
civil claim, as many cases will be brought after the plaintiff turns 25, and a significant number 
of these will be brought when the plaintiff is closer to 37. Therefore, in a case where the 
plaintiff does not disclose the abuse and later seeks to rely on the second limb of the close 
associate provision, a defendant may well try to argue that he or she does not fall within the 
close associate provision, to effectively bar the plaintiff’s access to court by seeking to have 
the standard limitation period applied. It is anticipated that in such cases, on the current 
drafting of the provision, defendants will argue that the child’s nondisclosure was produced 
not by the child’s perception of the tortfeasor’s relationship with the child’s parent, but for 
some other reason, thus evading classification as a close associate. If this argument is 
accepted, then prima facie the second limb does not appear to apply, and the special limitation 
period will not have been enlivened.39 
 
If the second limb is predicated on the child’s nondisclosure only because of the child’s 
perception of the tortfeasor’s relationship with the child’s parent, as seems to be the case from 
the drafting of the provision, then the wording of the second limb is too narrow. The reason 
for this is that a major cause of a child not disclosing sexual abuse, or of taking a long time to 
disclose the abuse, is not simply (or even necessarily) the abuser’s relationship with the 
child’s parent, and the child’s perception of this relationship and its effect. The reasons for 
nondisclosure and delayed disclosure are much more nuanced, and hinge on the nature of the 
acts constituting the abuse and, more importantly, the nature of any feelings about those acts 
that the child may have by himself or herself, or which have been imposed on the child. 
                                                 
39 There is obviously no judicial consideration of these provisions yet, since the provisions apply to 
cases of injury where the relevant alleged acts occurred on or after 6 December 2002, and 21 May 2003 
respectively: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50A(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27N. 
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The special limitation provision is intended to give victims of child abuse inflicted by parents 
and close associates of parents a reasonable period of time within which to institute legal 
proceedings. The core of the second limb of the close associate provision is concerned with 
the child’s willingness to disclose to his or her parent the acts constituting the alleged 
wrongdoing. To assess the adequacy of the content of this provision, that is, to ascertain 
whether the abused child’s perception of the tortfeasor’s relationship with the child’s parent is 
the dominant factor in children’s unwillingness to disclose their abuse, evidence about 
disclosure and nondisclosure by child abuse victims needs to be canvassed. 
 
 
IV EVIDENCE ABOUT NON-DISCLOSURE AND DELAYED DISCLOSURE 
 
A Psychological evidence: common injuries caused by child sexual abuse 
Before turning to evidence about the incidence and reasons for nondisclosure and delayed 
disclosure of child sexual abuse, it is first necessary to gain an understanding of the 
psychological impact of child sexual abuse on victims, which is inextricably linked with 
disclosure patterns. Detailed reviews of literature regarding the psychological injuries and 
effects common to victims of child sexual abuse have been recently undertaken by legal 
commentators in this context of child abuse and civil limitation periods,40 but a brief summary 
here is necessary. Immediate and short-term consequences for a child who is being or who 
has been sexually abused commonly include depression and low self-esteem,41 inappropriate 
sexualised behaviour,42 difficulty in peer relationships,43 and, particularly if the abuse 
                                                 
40 See for example Mathews, ‘Judicial consideration of reasonable conduct by survivors of child sexual 
abuse’, above n 6. 
41 T Wozencraft, W Wagner and A Pellegrin ‘Depression and suicidal ideation in sexually abused 
children’ (1991) 15 Child Abuse and Neglect 505. 
42 J McClellan, C McCurry, M Ronnei, J Adams, A Eisner and M Storck, ‘Age of onset of sexual 
abuse: relationship to sexually inappropriate behaviours’ (1996) 35 Journal of the American Academy 
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1375. 
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involves penetration and or is of long duration, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).44 In 
this context, PTSD is a particularly significant consequence of abuse because the avoidance 
symptom of PTSD entails the victim avoiding stimuli associated with the traumatic event, 
including stimuli that prompt or require recollection of the event.45 Since disclosing the abuse 
requires direct recollection and confrontation of it, PTSD alone is a highly significant reason 
behind many victims’ inability to disclose their abuse. The impact of PTSD can be seen in a 
number of reported cases of applications to extend the limitation period in cases of child 
sexual abuse, where the applicants all suffered PTSD.46 
 
Adolescents are likely to experience even higher levels of depression and anxiety than 
younger children because of their greater cognitive understanding of their abuse.47 
Adolescents may also be more susceptible than younger children to self-harm and suicidal 
ideation and behaviour.48 Substance abuse and running away from home are also more 
frequent in adolescents than younger children.49  
                                                                                                                                            
43 A Mannarino, J Cohen and S Berman, ‘The Children’s Attributions and Perceptions Scale: a new 
measure of sexual abuse-related factors’ (1994) 23 Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 204.  
44 E Deblinger, S McLeer, M Atkins, D Ralphe and E Foa, ‘Post-traumatic stress in sexually abused, 
physically abused, and nonabused children’ (1989) 13 Child Abuse and Neglect 403; S McLeer, M 
Callaghan, D Henry and J Wallen, ‘Psychiatric disorders in sexually abused children’ (1994) 33 
Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 313; D Wolfe, L Sas and C 
Wekerle, ‘Factors associated with the development of post-traumatic stress disorder among child 
victims of sexual abuse’ (1994) 18 Child Abuse and Neglect 37; S Boney-McCoy and D Finkelhor, 
‘Prior victimization: a risk factor for child sexual abuse and for PTSD-related symptomatology among 
sexually abused youth’ (1995) 19 Child Abuse and Neglect 1401; P Ackerman, J Newton, W 
McPherson, J Jones and R Dykman, ‘Prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric 
diagnoses in three groups of abused children (sexual, physical, and both)’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and 
Neglect 759; S McLeer, J Dixon, D Henry et al, ‘Psychopathology in non-clinically referred sexually 
abused children’ (1998) 37 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
1326; A Dubner and R Motta, ‘Sexually and Physically Abused Foster Care Children and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ (1999) 67 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 367. 
45 The avoidance response is the second criterion of PTSD as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual IV-TR: American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Of Mental 
Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision, Washington DC, American Psychiatric Association (2000) 463-8.  
46 Woodhead, Carter, Applications 861 and 864, and Hopkins, above n 6. 
47 C Gidycz and M Koss, ‘The impact of adolescent sexual victimization: standardized measures of 
anxiety, depression and behavioural deviancy’ (1989) 4 Violence and Victims 139. 
48 C Lanktree, J Briere and L Zaidi, ‘Incidence and impact of sexual abuse in a child outpatient sample: 
the role of direct inquiry’ (1991) 15 Child Abuse and Neglect 447; G Martin, H Bergen, A Richardson, 
L Roeger and S Allison, ‘Sexual abuse and suicidality: gender differences in a large community sample 
of adolescents’ (2004) 28 Child Abuse and Neglect 491. 
49 M Rotherham-Borus, K Mahler, C Koopman and K Langabeer, ‘Sexual abuse history and associated 
multiple risk behaviour in adolescent runaways’ (1996) 66 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 390. 
 17
 
Factors of individual resiliency mean that some adults who were exposed to child sexual 
abuse may not develop psychopathology in later life, particularly if the abuse was of low 
severity and duration, and if the victim had strong social support following the abuse.50 
Nevertheless, in the long-term, many adult survivors of child sexual abuse appear to be prone 
to psychopathology including PTSD, which again involves an inability to revisit the events51 
and there is persuasive evidence that adult survivors of child sexual abuse are susceptible to 
other problems including depressive symptoms,52 and anxiety and alcohol abuse.53 
 
B Psychological evidence: non-disclosure and delayed disclosure of child sexual 
abuse 
 
1 Non-disclosure and delayed disclosure: incidence 
An inability to disclose the abuse is related with these common psychological sequelae. 
Studies consistently demonstrate that many survivors of child sexual abuse never disclose it, 
and that for those who do become able to disclose it, many require a long period of time 
before they can do so. An Australian study found that 48 per cent of the women involved in 
the study had never disclosed their abuse, and of those who did disclose it, almost half did not 
                                                 
50 See a summary of research and commentary in D Fergusson and P Mullen, Childhood Sexual Abuse: 
An Evidence Based Perspective (1999) Sage, Thousand Oaks, 67-93. 
51 Studies of adult survivors of child sexual abuse have shown high rates of PTSD: see for example N 
Rodriguez, S Ryan, A Rowan and D Foy, ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder in a clinical sample of adult 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 943; A Rowan, D Foy, N 
Rodriguez and S Ryan, ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder in a clinical sample of adults sexually abused as 
children’ (1994) 18 Child Abuse and Neglect 51; and N Rodriguez, S Ryan, H Vande Kemp and D Foy, 
‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in adult female survivors of childhood sexual abuse: A comparison 
study’ (1997) 65 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 53. See generally also P Mullen, 
‘Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Life’ (1993) 163 British Journal of Psychiatry 
721; A Silverman, H Reinherz and R Giaconia, ‘The Long-term Sequelae of Child and Adolescent 
Abuse: A Longitudinal Community Study’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 709; A Horowitz, C 
Widom, J McLaughlin and H White, ‘The impact of childhood abuse and neglect on adult mental 
health: A prospective study’ (2001) 42 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 184; J Spataro, P 
Mullen, P Burgess, D Wells and S Moss, ‘Impact of child sexual abuse on mental health: Prospective 
study in males and females’ (2004) 184 British Journal of Psychiatry 416. 
52 Silverman, above n 51. 
53 Mullen (1993), above n 51. 
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do so until at least 10 years after the first abusive experience.54 Similarly, an American study 
of 288 female child rape victims, with the study participants having an average age of 44.9 
years, found that only 12 per cent had ever reported their assaults to authorities, and over 25 
per cent  had never disclosed their assault to anyone prior to the study.55 In Queensland, the 
Project Axis survey found that of 212 adult survivors of child sexual abuse, 25 took 5-9 years 
to disclose it, 33 took 10-19 years, and 51 took over 20 years.56 Significantly for this analysis, 
where the perpetrator is a relative, it is even more likely that the delay will be long. A 
Criminal Justice Commission analysis of Queensland Police Service data from 1994-1998 
found that of 3,721 reported offences committed by relatives, 25.5 per cent of survivors took 
1-5 years to report the acts; 9.7 per cent took 5-10 years; 18.2 per cent took 10-20 years, and 
14.2 per cent took more than 20 years.57 The effect on disclosure of the perpetrator’s familial 
connection is clearly relevant to the content of the close associate provision. 
 
2 Reasons for non-disclosure and delayed disclosure 
The typical child sex offender is male,58 and is a relative of the child or is otherwise known to 
the child.59 Particularly if the abuser is a family member, victims may suffer numerous 
abusive acts, which can occur over a period of months or years.60 In many cases, particularly 
when the abuser is known to the child - which constitutes the overwhelming majority of cases 
- a child will make no complaint about the abuse but will instead use strategies to cope with 
                                                 
54 J Fleming, ‘Prevalence of childhood sexual abuse in a community sample of Australian women’ 
(1997) 166(2) Medical Journal of Australia 65. 
55 D Smith, E Letourneau, B Saunders, D Kilpatrick, H Resnick and C Best, ‘Delay in Disclosure of 
Childhood Rape: Results From a National Survey’ (2000) 24 Child Abuse & Neglect 273. 
56 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS – Child Sexual Abuse 
in Queensland: The Nature and Extent (2000) Brisbane, 80 (Table 23). 
57 Ibid 82 (Table 25). 
58 Fergusson and Mullen, above n 50, 44. 
59 Fergusson and Mullen, above n 50, 45-7; Smith, above n 55. An analysis of Queensland Police 
Service data over a two-year period shows that of 8,504 reported child sex offences, 3,046 were 
committed by relatives, 1,158 were committed by acquaintances, 979 were committed by relatives, and 
only 686 were committed by individuals who were unknown to the complainant: Queensland Crime 
Commission and Queensland Police Service, above n 56, 56. 
60 M Dunne and M Legosz, ‘The consequences of childhood sexual abuse’ in Queensland Crime 
Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS – Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: 
Selected Research and Papers (2000) Brisbane, 44, 47-55; Fergusson and Mullen, above n 50, 47; D 
Finkelhor, ‘Current information on the scope and nature of child sexual abuse’ (1994) 4 Future of 
Children 31. 
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it.61 In general, it seems that children who are abused by a family member are less likely to 
report the abuse than if they are abused by a stranger,62 and several studies have found that 
children are the least likely to disclose when the perpetrator is a natural parent.63  
 
However, particularly when considering all incidences of abuse by persons known to the 
child, studies indicate that there are a number of reasons for nondisclosure and delayed 
disclosure.64 One of the most significant factors is fear, which can take different forms. The 
abused child is often sworn to secrecy through threats or more subtle strategies,65 and can fear 
reprisals from the abuser,66 or can fear that abuse will be perpetrated on other family 
members.67 He or she may fear family disruption or dissolution in the event of disclosure,68 or 
may fear being punished for making a complaint, or may fear not being believed.69 As well as 
these fears, the abused child, especially if young, may fear that the tortfeasor, for whom he or 
she may well have loyalty and genuine feelings, would be punished.70 
 
                                                 
61 R Summit, ‘The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome’ (1983) 7 Child Abuse and Neglect 
177. 
62 L Berliner and J Conte, ‘The process of victimization: the victims’ perspective’ (1990) 14 Child 
Abuse and Neglect 29; C Arata, ‘To tell or not to tell: current functioning of child sexual abuse 
survivors who disclosed their victimization’ (1998) 3 Child Maltreatment 63. 
63 M Sauzier, ‘Disclosure of child sexual abuse: For better or for worse’ (1989) 12 Psychiatric Clinics 
of North America 455; L Sas, Three years after the verdict (1993) London Family Court Clinic, 
London: Ontario. 
64 For a recent summary of the literature, see M Paine and D Hansen, ‘Factors influencing children to 
self-disclose sexual abuse’ (2002) 22 Clinical Psychology Review 271. 
65 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, above n 56, 89-90.  
66 D Russell, The secret trauma: Incest in the lives of girls and women (1986) Basic Books, New York, 
132; T Lyon, ‘The effect of threats on children’s disclosure of sexual abuse’ (1996) 9(3) The APSAC 
Advisor 9; S Palmer, R Brown, N Rae-Grant and M Loughlin, ‘Responding to children’s disclosure of 
familial abuse: What survivors tell us’ (1999) 78 Child Welfare 259; T Goodman-Brown, R Edelstein, 
G Goodman, D Jones and D Gordon, ‘Why children tell: a model of children’s disclosure of sexual 
abuse’ (2003) 27 Child Abuse and Neglect 525. 
67 Berliner and Conte, above n 62; Goodman-Brown, above n 66. 
68 L Lawson and M Chaffin, ‘False negatives in sexual abuse disclosure interviews: Incidence and 
influence of caretaker’s belief in abuse in cases of accidental abuse discovery by Diagnosis of STD’ 
(1992) 7 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 532. 
69 B Gomes-Schwartz, J Horowitz and A Cardarelli, Child sexual abuse: the initial effects (1990) Sage, 
Newbury Park. 
70 M Mian, W Wehrspann, H Kaljner-Diamond, D LeBaron and J Winder, ‘Review of 125 children 6 
years of age and under who were sexually abused’ (1986) 10 Child Abuse & Neglect 223; T Furniss, 
The multi-professional handbook of child sexual abuse: integrated management, therapy, and legal 
intervention (1991) Routledge, London. 
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Many very young child victims who lack cognitive development may not understand that the 
acts are abusive.71 Even when a child does know or feel that the acts are wrong and or 
abusive, he or she may often possess misplaced guilt and feelings of responsibility for the 
acts.72 Common feelings of shame and embarrassment are also prominent factors in victims’ 
initial and ongoing reluctance to disclose their abuse.73 
 
From this evidence, it can be appreciated that in a number of cases, one reason for 
nondisclosure or delayed disclosure may indeed involve the child’s perception of the 
tortfeasor’s relationship with the parent. For example, a young boy abused by his uncle might 
not disclose the abuse for fear of disrupting the family. This fear would be related to the boy’s 
understanding that the abuser has a significant relationship with the boy’s parents. 
 
However, most of the reasons identified by the research about nondisclosure and delayed 
disclosure arise independently of the child’s perception of the abuser’s relationship with his or 
her parent. Many reasons have no connection at all with the tortfeasor’s relationship with the 
parent, or with the child’s perception of it. A large proportion of tortfeasors (sports coaches, 
teachers, clergy, and parents and relatives of friends) will not have any relationship with the 
child’s parent but the child may still not disclose, or may only disclose after a long delay, for 
the reasons identified by the psychological research. In addition, even where the child is 
reluctant to disclose because of the tortfeasor’s close relationship with the child’s parent, that 
might be only one of the reasons motivating the child’s silence. Other reasons such as shame 
and fear of reprisal could play a larger role in the child’s nondisclosure.  
 
                                                 
71 Berliner and Conte, above n 62. 
72 P Ney, C Moore, M McPhee and P Trought, ‘Child abuse: a study of the child’s perspective’ (1986) 
10 Child Abuse and Neglect 511; Berliner and Conte, above n 62; K Bussey and E Grimbeek, 
‘Disclosure processes: issues for child sexual abuse victims’ in K Rotenberg (ed) Disclosure Processes 
in Children and Adolescents (1995) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, cited in Queensland 
Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, above n 56, 88; Goodman-Brown, above n 66. 
73 D Finkelhor, A sourcebook on child sexual abuse (1986) Sage, Beverley Hills. 
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Throughout Australia there are very few reported cases where victims of child abuse have 
been able to institute proceedings against responsible parties, largely because child abuse 
(especially sexual abuse) has only gained medical and psychological recognition in the last 20 
years or so, with public consciousness occurring later still, and because the psychological 
sequelae of abuse and the time limits imposed on actions for injury sustained as a child have 
been used by defendants to defeat claims.74 Yet, cases where plaintiffs have sought an 
extension of the limitation period to enable the institution of civil proceedings contribute to an 
analysis of the second limb of the close associate provision. In particular, the reasons for these 
plaintiffs’ delayed disclosure exemplify both psychological evidence of the consequences of 
child sexual abuse and the findings of empirical studies of delayed disclosure and non-
disclosure, and demonstrate that a perception of the perpetrator’s relationship with the child’s 
parent is not a particularly relevant factor in delayed disclosure. 
 
For example, in Williams v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy,75 the plaintiff suffered abuse 
between the ages of seven and 11, and did not disclose it until age 20 because the abuser, a 
priest at the orphanage where the plaintiff resided, threatened to kill him if he told anyone 
what was happening. Even after this disclosure, which was made to his mother, no action was 
taken because the plaintiff’s mother begged him not to say anything to anyone because of the 
embarrassment she thought it would cause the family, and because she did not want to take 
action against the church. The plaintiff only disclosed the abuse in 1994, aged 58, some 47 
years after the abuse ceased and 38 years after his initial disclosure.76 In Woodhead, the 
plaintiff was abused between the ages of seven and 13 by a friend of her adoptive parents, but 
she did not disclose the abuse until she was 13, and, due to PTSD, she was not able to 
thoroughly discuss the abuse until she was in her mid-twenties.77 In Carter, the plaintiff, who 
                                                 
74 For a detailed discussion of this, see Mathews, ‘Judicial consideration of reasonable conduct by 
survivors of child sexual abuse’, above n 6. 
75 Williams v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of Queensland, Helman J, 17 January 1996), copy on file with author. 
76 Ibid 2-3. 
77 Woodhead v Elbourne, above n 6, 221-24. 
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resided in an orphanage and who was abused in multiple ways by a number of parties 
including allegedly being raped by an orphanage employee from the age of seven, originally 
complained of this abuse aged eight but was assaulted and punished by authorities for making 
the complaint. In large part due to PTSD, she did not disclose her history of abuse in detail 
until 1997, more than 25 years after she left the orphanage.78 In the case of Applicant S, the 
plaintiff, who was abused by her schoolteacher when she was aged eight to 10, did not 
disclose the abuse until 1998, more than 30 years after the events. This delayed disclosure 
was caused by several factors including PTSD, shame, guilt, self-blame, and the belief that 
nobody would believe her if she disclosed the abuse.79 Similarly, in Calder, the plaintiff, who 
alleged abuse by her brother when she was aged 13, also delayed her disclosure because of 
feelings of intense shame, guilt, self-blame, and misplaced responsibility for the abuse. There, 
the plaintiff only became able to disclose and explore her experience in 2000, 28 years after 
they occurred.80 As a final example, the plaintiff in the case of Wilson, who was abused by her 
uncle when she was aged five to 12, delayed her disclosure because her uncle told her the 
events were secret, and she did not realise the abusive acts were wrongful. She also suffered 
PTSD, and these facts and consequences combined to delay her disclosure of her abuse until 
1994, 14 years after the abuse ceased.81 
 
Therefore, the psychological and empirical evidence about disclosure of child sexual abuse, 
which are exemplified by the factual histories of applicants for extensions of time in child 
abuse cases in Australia, shows that the second limb of the close associate provision should 
not be limited to cases where a child does not disclose the acts because of the child’s 
perception of the tortfeasor’s relationship with the child’s parent. Instead, the conceptual core 
of the second limb - the child’s unwillingness to disclose the acts causing the injury - merits 
the activation of the special limitation period, unrestricted by the apparent qualifier of the 
                                                 
78 Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335, above 
n 6, [41]-[46], [49], [75], [83]. 
79 Applications 861 and 864, above n 6, 3-4, 11-12. 
80 Calder v Uzelac, above n 7, [2]-[3]. 
81 Wilson v Horne, above n 4, 365. 
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‘person whose relationship with the parent’ clause. This does not make redundant the first 
limb of the provision, nor does it affect the merit of the special limitation period in cases of 
injury to a child by apparent or guardian. However, it does suggest that the second limb of the 
close associate provision should be redrafted to capture deserving cases where the injured 
child delays disclosure of his or her abuse, not because of any perception about the 
tortfeasor’s relationship with the child’s parent, but because of the unwillingness to disclose 
the abusive events, whether this is produced by fear, shame, guilt, self-blame, secrecy, failure 
to appreciate that the acts were wrongful, or PTSD. This approach would be more effective in 
securing what should be the aim of the provision, which, as referred to by the Ipp Report, is to 
allow the plaintiff sufficient time both to be free of the influence of the defendant, and to have 
overcome the psychological sequelae of the events, to the extent necessary to be able to 
pursue civil remedies.  
 
 
 V CONCLUSION 
 
Despite being an underreported phenomenon, in Queensland in a twelve month period from 
2002-03 there were 610 substantiated cases of child sexual abuse.82 In that period throughout 
Australia, there were 4137 substantiated cases of child sexual abuse.83 Unfortunately there is 
no reason to believe that the incidence of serious child abuse will decline. With society and 
government perhaps able to reduce child abuse, but unable to prevent it, it is important that 
the legal system at least enable adequate access to justice and redress for survivors of child 
abuse. The enactment of the special limitation period in New South Wales and Victoria is a 
commendable and long overdue recognition of the inadequacy of the previous limitation 
period applying to child abuse cases, which still operates elsewhere in Australia but will 
                                                 
82 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child protection Australia 2002-03 (2004) Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, Canberra, 16 (Table 2.5). 
83 Ibid 16-17. 
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hopefully soon be amended.84 The recognition of evidence from other disciplines made 
possible the Ipp Report’s recommendation about the special limitation period, and that 
evidence underpins the provisions enacted. Now, that same evidence, including evidence 
about nondisclosure and delayed disclosure, should also be acknowledged to ensure that the 
substance of the second limb of the close associate provision is not neutralised. 
                                                 
84 For reasons discussed in Mathews, ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods’, above n 17, 256. 
